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INTRODUCTION 
A recent series of climate change lawsuits has sought to mimic the 
“regulation through litigation” approach of the claims brought by the 
states against cigarette manufacturers.1  What is distinctive about the 
cigarette cases relative to conventional tort claims is that they were not 
brought on behalf of individual smokers, but rather sought to recoup 
the Medicaid-related costs of smoking.  A parallel climate change liti-
gation approach seeks payments from public utilities, energy produc-
ers, and other parties responsible for greenhouse gas emissions to re-
flect the long-term societal damages that the plaintiffs claim will be 
caused by this pollution. 
While environmental litigation of this type is unprecedented, the 
cigarette cases were novel as well.  The cigarette litigation did not es-
tablish legal precedents because the cases were settled without any 
court verdicts, but the threat of the suits was sufficiently real that it led 
to damages payments of close to $250 billion.2  Here we examine the 
similarities and differences between lawsuits seeking to recoup the 
value of financial externalities caused by smoking and lawsuits tar-
geted at the value of environmental damages due to global warming. 
The climate change litigation may not be only about money; it 
may have a policy purpose as well.  Depending on how the damages 
payments are structured, this litigation may also be viewed as an at-
† Professor of Law and Economics, Vanderbilt University. 
†† University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and Management, Van-
derbilt University. 
1 E.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (dismissing on justiciability grounds the complaints in a major environmental 
public nuisance lawsuit).  For a general discussion of climate change litigation, see Vin-
cent S. Oleszkiewicz & Douglas B. Sanders, The Advent of Climate Change Litigation 
Against Corporate Defendants, 27 Int’l Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 936 (Nov. 17, 2004). 
2 W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS:  A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL 4 
(2002). 
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tempt to use the incentives created by the court system to generate the 
policy changes needed to curb the risks of global climate change.  In 
this Article, we examine whether current policies have failed, the 
sources of any such failure, and the overall context of climate change 
litigation and policy design more broadly. 
In order to identify what market failure might be addressed by 
climate change litigation, we begin in Part I by exploring whether 
emissions controls are currently at efficient levels.  Even apart from 
emissions related to climate change, there is a shortfall in the strin-
gency of regulation.  This failure is one of inadequate policy responses 
to air pollution externalities.  Recognition of the expected costs of 
global warming bolsters the case for more stringent regulation. 
In Part II we explore whether litigation can play a constructive 
role by comparing the proposed climate change litigation approach to 
the cigarette litigation.  There are fundamental differences in the 
economic structures of smoking and climate change externalities and 
in the nature of their associated risks.  Careful comparison with the 
cigarette litigation indicates that the situations are not analogous. 
Empirical evidence presented in Part III traces the main short-
coming of climate change policy to the public’s unwillingness to incur 
substantial costs to reduce global warming risks.  Given the lack of de-
tailed U.S. data and the prominence of Europe in the climate change 
debate, this Article examines two large European data sets reporting 
information on individual beliefs about climate change and the ac-
tions that Europeans are willing to take to address their concerns.  
This exploration of the public’s risk beliefs and policy preferences 
highlights many of the pitfalls that could impede support for climate 
change policies—notably, the failure of people to properly under-
stand the risks associated with global warming and the presence of 
substantial self-interest across generational lines that is important 
given the long time periods over which the risks of climate change will 
materialize. 
In addition to these political economy rationales affecting support 
for climate change policies, there are also a variety of sources of irra-
tionality that influence the public’s preferences and, in turn, govern-
ment policy.  First, people may not properly understand what factors 
lead to climate change or the importance of climate change risks.  
Second, there is substantial uncertainty about these risks, which may 
lead to a failure to view the risks as being real.  Third, because the 
risks are very distant, all the anomalies associated with failure to make 
rational intertemporal choices will come into play. 
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Overall, the problems associated with current policies and market 
operations with respect to the risks of climate change are attributable 
to factors that are much broader than possible wrongful conduct on 
the part of the defendants in these suits.  Although the mismatch be-
tween the policy failure problem and the pending litigation is substan-
tial, damages remedies along the lines of those implemented in the 
cigarette litigation conceivably might play a constructive role.  How-
ever, there is no assurance that the plaintiffs’ incentives will mirror so-
ciety’s broader interests or that the damages structure that emerges 
from the litigation will create appropriate incentives to reduce emis-
sions in an efficient manner.  Regulation through litigation is a less 
desirable climate change policy approach than a sound regulatory pol-
icy that reflects society’s broad interests. 
I.  THE FAILURE OF GOVERNMENT ACTION 
Climate change and global warming are classic examples of stan-
dard economic textbook externalities situations.  Private actions gen-
erate harms that are not adequately addressed by incentives in the 
marketplace.  The solution for such inadequacies is to impose gov-
ernment regulation or implement some kind of pollution tax that will 
align the private incentives with socially efficient incentives. 3
As an economic principle, the efficiency objective should be to 
maximize the spread between benefits and costs.4  In the usual situa-
tion, in which marginal benefits are declining as pollution control be-
comes more stringent and marginal costs are rising, the maximization 
of the net social benefits occurs where marginal benefits equal mar-
ginal costs.  If there is a policy shift that leads to a higher level of mar-
ginal benefits for any given level of policy stringency, then the optimal 
level of pollution control is increased.  For the purposes of our discus-
sion, we assume that there are additional benefits to reducing climate 
change. 
With this background information, it is useful to consider the ex-
ternal costs of emissions.  Table 1 presents the summary of the social 
3 See W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS 
OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 745-50 (4th ed. 2005) (identifying environmental 
regulation as one way to mitigate externalities). 
4 This basic principle of benefit-cost analysis is articulated in a variety of texts, such 
as EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 137-38 
(1978). 
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costs associated with different energy sources.5  The first column of 
the table indicates the tax rate per unit (gallon, cubic foot, or ton) for 
the different energy sources (e.g., for gasoline, the tax is per gallon).  
The second column lists the current tax as a percentage of the price.  
The third column is the externality cost as a percentage of the price, 
where these externality cost estimates are based on a variety of gov-
ernment assessments, including regulatory impact analyses under-
taken by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  These ex-
ternal costs do not include impacts on global climate change. 
For gasoline, the tax rate and the externality cost are almost iden-
tical, as they are each 17%.  If these average cost values are also indica-
tive of the level of costs, then that would suggest that the current tax 
structure is efficient, excluding climate change effects.  However, if 
there is an additional marginal benefit associated with environmental 
regulation through reduction of the risks of climate change, then the 
externality cost estimate would be greater than the current tax.  This 
would be a rationale for increasing the tax. 
The emissions component of particular pertinence to global 
warming is carbon.6  The final column in Table 1 indicates the relative 
carbon tax that would be appropriate given the carbon emissions per 
unit of each type of fuel.  Each of the energy sources is rated accord-
ing to its carbon content relative to natural gas.  Natural gas is the 
cleanest of these energy sources and, consequently, serves as the nu-
meraire in rating the different energy sources.  The carbon emissions 
burden is presented in relative terms rather than in absolute dollar 
cost terms because of the difficulty in monetizing the costs associated 
with carbon emissions.  As indicated, this relative carbon tax amount 
for gasoline is fairly substantial, but it is below that of coal, diesel fuel, 
and heating oil. 
 
 
 
 
 
5 This tabulation is as of 1986 and, unfortunately, no update exists.  Consequently, 
for the purposes of our analysis, we will assume that the same relationships embodied 
in this table hold true today. 
6 For a more general discussion of the appropriate role of carbon taxes, see Roy 
Boyd, Kerry Krutilla & W. Kip Viscusi, Energy Taxation as a Policy Instrument To Reduce 
CO2 Emissions:  A Net Benefit Analysis, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1995). 
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Table 1:  Summary of Energy Externalities and Taxes  
Assuming Compliance with Existing Environmental Standards7
 
 Current 
Tax per 
Unita
Current 
Tax as a 
Percent of 
Price 
Externality Cost 
Estimate as  
Percent of Priceb
Relative 
Carbon 
Taxc
Gasoline  
(gal) 
0.15 16.60 16.74 27.89 
Diesel Fuel     
(gal) 
0.12 12.90 50.40 52.88 
Aircraft Fuel 
(gal) 
0.10 15.50 12.94 n.a. 
Natural Gas 
(1000 cu. ft.) 
0.25 6.40 1.11 1.00 
Heating Oils 
(gal) 
0.10 14.60 63.69 47.99 
Wood  
(tons) 
0.00 0.00 152.43 0.00 
Coal  
(tons) 
11.95 35.90 528.01 104.87 
a Current tax per unit includes federal, state, and local excises, severance taxes, 
public utility taxes, and windfall profits taxes.  It excludes taxes designated for particu-
lar uses, the Federal Highway Trust Fund, Superfund Tax, and Black Lung Tax.  Vis-
cusi et al., supra note 7, at 32. 
b These figures are based on midpoint environmental damage estimates.  Id. 
c These figures are based upon carbon emissions per unit of fuel.  Relative carbon 
tax values are normalized with natural gas equal to 1.  Id. 
 
Diesel fuel is the second energy source listed in the table.  The 
current tax rate of 13% is comparable to that of gasoline.  However, 
diesel fuel is much more polluting than gasoline, as diesel fuel’s ex-
ternality cost estimate is just over 50% of the price.  Even when con-
sidering only those pollution emissions unrelated to global climate 
change, the tax on diesel fuel is inordinately low.  Moreover, if one 
were to take into account the carbon emissions per unit of diesel fuel, 
then the appropriate tax rate would be even higher, given that the 
relative carbon tax value in the final column of Table 1 is almost 53. 
Two other major energy sources in Table 1 are related to the pro-
duction of electricity by coal-fired electric power and heating plants:  
heating oils and coal.  In each instance, the externality cost estimate is 
 
7 Table 1 is from W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley Magat, Alan Carlin, & Mark Dreyfus, Envi-
ronmentally Responsible Energy Pricing, 15 ENERGY J. 23, 32 tbl.2 (1994).  All cost estimates 
are based on 1986 damages estimates. 
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considerably greater than the current tax per unit price.  Moreover, 
the relative carbon tax value is considerable, particularly compared to 
that for gasoline, which often is the focus of policy discussions about 
global warming. 
In brief, for these energy sources, even if we ignore the externality 
costs of climate change, there is still a strong rationale for increasing 
the tax values above their current levels.  Moreover, if the climate 
change consequences of these energy sources are accounted for, the 
additional marginal benefit derived from reducing these emissions 
warrants even more aggressive policies to control the emissions 
sources. 
Notwithstanding the failure of the United States to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol, the scientific evidence suggests that there are, in fact, 
significant benefits associated with reducing emissions related to cli-
mate change.8  There is, of course, a probability distribution associ-
ated with these benefit values at different points in time, but there 
seems to be little dispute that there are nonzero benefits associated 
with reducing emissions related to global warming.9
A broad range of options is available to address the risks associ-
ated with climate change.  These include carbon taxes, cap-and-trade 
policies, command-and-control types of interventions, and various 
forms of remediation.10  What is noteworthy is that, despite the avail-
ability of a variety of policies to address climate change hazards, to 
date there has been very little initiative of any type specifically target-
ing this environmental threat.  Thus, from the standpoint of policy as-
sessment, the failure in dealing with global warming hazards includes 
a government or regulatory failure rather than simply a failure of pri-
vate markets. 
8 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], WORKING GROUPS 
I, II & III, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:  SYNTHESIS REPORT 19-23 (Robert T. Watson ed., 
2001) [hereinafter IPCC, 2001 SYNTHESIS REPORT] (assessing the effects of emissions 
reduction on climates, environments, and economies). 
9 See id. at 8-13 (analyzing the consequences of present emissions policies over the 
next 25, 50, and 100 years). 
10 For examples of the kinds of policy options that could be mustered to address 
the risk of climate change, see Joseph E. Aldy, Scott Barrett & Robert N. Stavins, Thir-
teen Plus One:  A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 373 
(2003); Alan Carlin, Global Climate Control:  Is There a Better Strategy than Reducing Green-
house Gas Emissions?, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1401 (2007).  For an examination of cap-and-
trade policies, see Ted Gayer & John K. Horowitz, Market-Based Approaches to Environ-
mental Regulation, 1 FOUND. & TRENDS MICROECONOMICS 201 (2005). 
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In view of this government failure, the use of litigation to address 
the consequences of climate change might be viewed as being under 
the general purview of the overall regulation through litigation 
movement.11  To the extent that litigation can replicate what a mean-
ingful government policy can do, it will do so by establishing appro-
priate incentives to control emissions related to global warming at ef-
ficient levels.  What is missing from the litigation process is any 
internal check to ensure that an efficiency-based pollution control ob-
jective is being fostered and that the preferences reflected in the in-
centives created by the litigation coincide with those of society more 
generally.  It is likely, for example, that the private gain that the litiga-
tors stand to reap from such litigation is a strong motivation.  There is 
no assurance that these private gains are in line with societal benefits 
and costs. 
It is also relevant that the mix of activities that leads to carbon 
emissions is quite diverse and may not encompass all of the defen-
dants named in any particular case.  Gasoline, for example, is quite 
different from heating oil and electricity produced in coal-fired 
plants.  Wholly apart from the problem of allocating responsibility 
among potentially responsible parties, there is the additional difficulty 
that any comprehensive litigation-based approach to addressing global 
warming problems must encompass a broad set of activities that gen-
erate these emissions rather than focusing on a single component 
alone. 
II.  THE CIGARETTE LITIGATION MODEL 
It is instructive to examine the cigarette litigation model in detail 
and to compare the components of that litigation to those of the cli-
mate change cases.  The main similarity is that the cases involve exter-
nal harms of various types, for which there is an attempt to recoup 
damages.  In addition, in each instance the financial stakes involved in 
the litigation are at an unprecedented high level.  But these similari-
ties mask many fundamental differences. 
In 1998, the major cigarette manufacturers settled a series of law-
suits filed by states to recoup the Medicaid costs associated with smok-
ing.  Four states—Florida, Texas, Mississippi, and Minnesota—settled 
separately with the industry, and the remaining states settled in what is 
11 See generally REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002). 
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known as the Master Settlement Agreement.12  The overall stakes asso-
ciated with the settlement were close to $250 billion. 
The structure of the cigarette lawsuit was novel in several respects.  
As with the climate change lawsuits, the probability of success for such 
cigarette litigation initially seemed low.  In contrast to earlier tobacco 
suits, these claims did not seek damages for the personal health costs 
and income losses suffered by individual smokers.  Instead, the claims 
were for the financial costs incurred by the states because of smoking 
behavior.  The mere existence of financial costs due to a product does 
not trigger liability.  For example, over 40,000 people a year die in 
motor vehicle accidents, yet the automobile companies are not liable 
for all of the medical expenses attributable to these fatal accidents.13
The litigation landscape for climate change lawsuits is quite dis-
similar to that of cigarettes.  To begin, consider the evidence on the 
health risks of smoking in comparison to evidence on the health risks 
of global warming.  What is distinctive about our knowledge of the 
risks of smoking relative to climate change risks is that many smoking 
risks are known with substantial precision.  Beginning with the 1964 
report by the U.S. Surgeon General that concluded that smoking in-
creased the risk of lung cancer,14 there has been a steady stream of 
studies by the Surgeon General and other government entities docu-
menting the risks associated with smoking.  The 1989 report of the 
Surgeon General summarized much of this evidence with respect to a 
broad range of health risks.15  Under the usual criteria for statistical 
significance, there is firm evidence of large and statistically significant 
risks of smoking for a broad range of ailments, including coronary 
heart disease, hypertensive heart disease, ulcers, influenza and pneu-
monia, bronchitis and emphysema, and a wide variety of cancers.16
12 For a discussion of the Master Settlement Agreement and the associated costs, 
see VISCUSI, supra note 2, at 40-45. 
13 Statistics on the number of people killed in motor vehicle accidents each year 
are from NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL INJURY FACTS 2005-2006, 
at 86 (2006).  For a discussion of the limitations on generalizing the cigarette litigation 
precedent, see Gary T. Schwartz, Cigarette Litigation’s Offspring:  Assessing Tort Issues Re-
lated to Guns, Alcohol, & Other Controversial Products in Light of the Tobacco Wars, 27 PEPP. 
L. REV. 751 (2000). 
14 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH:  REPORT OF 
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
31 (1964). 
15 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSE-
QUENCES OF SMOKING:  TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS:  A REPORT OF THE SURGEON 
GENERAL 100 (1989). 
16 See id. at 148 (comparing health risks to current and former smokers). 
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To understand the difference between our knowledge of cigarette 
health risks versus climate change health risks, consider why we know 
so much about the hazards to individuals from smoking.  The main 
reason is that we have available substantial information from numer-
ous scientific studies based on a large number of observations.  With 
over one-fifth of the adult U.S. population continuing to smoke,17 and 
an even higher smoking prevalence rate in earlier decades, there are 
millions of people who have smoked, and a substantial scientific litera-
ture has documented the quite serious health consequences of smok-
ing based on epidemiological studies and other statistical evidence. 
The precision of our knowledge is not attributable to large num-
bers alone.  The long time period over which we can observe the con-
sequences of smoking is relevant as well.  Many of the ailments associ-
ated with smoking have a latency period.  Smoking a cigarette on 
one’s eighteenth birthday will not give one lung cancer tomorrow, but 
a commitment to continuing smoking behavior after one’s eighteenth 
birthday will generate a substantial risk of lung cancer in one’s later 
years.  The availability of data over a long time period as well as in-
formation on personal histories with respect to smoking enable us to 
obtain a retrospective and relatively precise assessment of the risks of 
smoking. 
In contrast, the risks associated with climate change are based on 
substantially weaker information.  While there are millions of individ-
ual decisions that may affect the risks of climate change, there are not 
millions of independent experiments.  Pollution emissions have 
broader effects, so the effect of different emissions on climate change 
is measurable only at the level of large regions.  Thus, our effective 
sample size with respect to assessing how pollution exposures cause 
climate change is much more limited than for smoking. 
A second difference in the risk information base concerns the 
time period.  Most of the risks and potential damages of climate 
change are prospective.  Thus, we are not making a judgment with re-
spect to levels of pollution emissions that were present in the 1940s 
and 1950s and the harms they have caused.  Rather, we are in com-
paratively uncharted territory in which we are attempting to assess the 
future consequences of current pollution emissions that are at a much 
17 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:  HEALTH 
AND NUTRITION 130 tbl.190 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/ 
statab/2006/health_nutrition/health.pdf. 
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higher level than they were decades earlier.18  Making these linkages is 
not entirely guesswork, but it does lack the same level of experimental 
evidence that we have regarding the harms attributable to smoking. 
Both the risks of smoking and the risks associated with climate 
change have a latency period.  What differs is that, in the case of ciga-
rettes, the time period that has elapsed since people have begun 
smoking cigarettes is sufficiently long that the risks can be manifested.  
In contrast, it may not be until much later in the twenty-first century 
that the consequences of continuing our current emissions practices 
will be manifested in climate outcomes. 
The natures of the harms resulting from smoking and from emis-
sions that cause climate change are quite different as well.  Smoking 
poses substantial risks to the health of the individual product user.  
The health consequences of smoking are clearly adverse.  These 
health impacts then lead to financial costs that can be well docu-
mented.  In contrast, the risks associated with climate change cause 
worldwide climatological shifts of uncertain magnitude and of uncer-
tain desirability that may vary regionally.  Climate change does not 
necessarily imply climate-related damages.  As an extreme example, 
perhaps Finland may benefit by being a bit warmer than it is today. 
An additional difference between the risks of smoking and those 
of climate change is the potential for adaptation.  In the case of many 
ailments associated with smoking, such as lung cancer and emphy-
sema, there are medical treatments available, but there are few behav-
ioral changes that one can adopt to make life with a fatal form of can-
cer as lengthy and as enjoyable as life without the disease.  In contrast, 
global warming may lead to a shift in the types of crops that are pro-
duced and other behavioral responses that will mute much of the 
damages as compared to what would occur if there were no behavioral 
adaptive responses.19
The context of the decision involving the alleged wrongful con-
duct is quite different for cigarettes than for emissions that generate 
greenhouse gases.  In the case of the consumer choice for cigarettes, 
the issue is whether consumers are adequately informed of the health 
risks to themselves and the addictive properties of cigarettes that will 
affect their future smoking behaviors.  If consumers are not ade-
18 See IPCC, 2001 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 8, at 30-34 (listing the “robust 
findings” and “key uncertainties” in current projections about the consequences of 
pollution). 
19 The possibility of adaptive responses to climate change is discussed in id. at 12. 
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quately informed, the question arises whether the wrongful conduct 
by the cigarette industry defendants led people to misperceive the 
risks in a way that influenced smoking decisions that people would not 
have made had they possessed sound information.  Note that in the 
cigarette context, the company is directly involved in providing in-
formation about the product and selling the product to consumers, 
and the product itself generates health risks for its users. 
The market analog in the case of greenhouse gases does not have 
a parallel structure.  Consider, for example, automobile emissions.  
Should the counterpart for a cigarette industry defendant be a manu-
facturer of automobiles and trucks?  Alternatively, should the perti-
nent defendant be a company that produces and sells gasoline?  From 
an economic standpoint, the decisions people make regarding how 
much they will drive and how much they commute will be guided by 
the economic incentives that they face, which will include the price of 
gasoline and the cost of fuel-efficient cars.  The risks posed by one’s 
personal greenhouse emissions are negligible for the owner and op-
erator of the automobile, whereas the individual who smokes ciga-
rettes is exposed to considerable risks.  From the standpoint of indi-
vidual decision making, unless a person has a substantial altruistic 
interest in protecting the environment, gasoline usage decisions will 
be governed by the private payoffs to the individual user. 
How could the potential corporate defendants have reduced these 
environmental damages?  Unlike in the case of cigarettes, providing 
accurate information to consumers would not have sufficed, as the 
risks involved are external to the individual decision maker.  At most, 
providing information might have generated some altruistic interest 
in the environment.  Similarly, if a particular seller of gasoline chose 
to market its gasoline at an extra fifty cents a gallon to discourage us-
age and to curb greenhouse emissions, then consumers would simply 
buy gasoline from competitors, driving it out of business.  Ultimately, 
the world market price for oil will be the main force influencing do-
mestic gasoline consumption, not firm-specific pricing that seeks to 
set a price above the market price. 
In a similar vein, automobile companies could also choose to pro-
duce cars that achieve high gas mileage.  Thus, for example, Toyota 
could abandon its diverse product line and sell only the Prius, a fuel-
efficient, gas-electric “hybrid.”  However, if it did so, it would lose sub-
stantial market share to manufacturers of automobiles that are less 
fuel efficient but provide other offsetting advantages to the consumer, 
such as more horsepower. 
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Public utilities likewise do not have complete leeway to address 
the climatological consequences of their activities.  Public utilities, 
such as electric power plants, are natural monopolies that are subject 
to stringent regulation of their price structures.20  In some instances, 
rigid legislative price caps may impose an upper bound on the retail 
price of electricity.21  As a result, utilities cannot simply raise the price 
of electricity to encourage conservation.  Nor can they engage in 
unlimited investments in emissions reductions, as these costs ulti-
mately must be covered through higher price levels, which are con-
strained. 
It may be more appropriate to frame the potential defendants of 
the climate change litigation in terms of tobacco farmers rather than 
cigarette manufacturers.  In much the same way that Shell sells gaso-
line that is used in cars, tobacco farmers grow tobacco for use in ciga-
rettes.  Each of these parties could choose to exit the market alto-
gether.  Tobacco farmers could replant their fields with soybeans or 
other crops, and Shell could stop selling gas.  The exit of any particu-
lar farmer or gasoline retailer will not affect prices because the market 
is large.  The manufacture of tobacco is worldwide, as is the produc-
tion of oil. 
It may also be more appropriate to compare the risks that emis-
sions pose for global warming to those associated with environmental 
tobacco smoke rather than to primary cigarette smoking risks.  Envi-
ronmental tobacco smoke creates externalities that affect people ex-
posed to the smoke.22  The cigarette industry itself has no control over 
where people smoke, so the absence of smoking restrictions or the 
failure of smokers to smoke in areas that will not expose others to the 
risks is not under company control.  In addition, the risks associated 
with environmental tobacco smoke are highly uncertain and much 
debated, much like the continuing controversy with respect to the so-
cietal harms caused by climate change.  Perhaps because of these vari-
ous externalities, all of which bear a strong resemblance to the climate 
change litigation, there has been very little litigation activity with re-
20 See VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 3, at 429-62 (presenting various 
regulatory models for the electric power industry). 
21 Id. at 441, 458. 
22 For an exploration of the literature on these externalities, see U.S. EPA OFFICE 
OF HEALTH & ENVTL. ASSESSMENT, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING:  
LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS (1992).  For a critique of this evidence, see Gary 
L. Huber, Robert E. Brockie & Vijay K. Mahajan, Smoke and Mirrors:  The EPA’s Flawed 
Study of Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Lung Cancer, 1993 REGULATION 44, 45-47. 
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spect to environmental tobacco smoke.23  Instead, there has been a 
major surge in regulation of the risks posed by environmental tobacco 
smoke.  The preferability of a regulatory solution rather than a litiga-
tory solution to climate change risks also parallels the trajectory of in-
terventions affecting environmental tobacco smoke. 
Cigarette litigation does, however, provide a blueprint for think-
ing about damages associated with actions by defendants in climate 
change cases, should such litigation occur.  The central question in 
the state attorneys’ general suits, and in cigarette litigation more gen-
erally, is what the harms to the smokers would have been without the 
alleged wrongful conduct of the cigarette manufacturer.  Smoking 
causes well-established and identifiable harms that are both financial 
and health related.  In the states’ lawsuits, the harms were financial; in 
cases brought by individuals, the harms also included the health loss 
to the individual smoker.  The harms caused by global climate change 
are diverse, but the distribution of possible effects is much more dif-
fuse and uncertain. 
It can be difficult to link the harms to the actions of the defen-
dant.  For individual cigarette lawsuits, the questions often are what 
brand the plaintiff smoked and for what time period.  The state ciga-
rette litigation focused more on a market share approach to account 
for the share of medical expenses attributable to each brand.  As a 
general rule, market share liability and various proportional liability 
approaches remain controversial, but if there is going to be any link-
age of the damages associated with climate change to the defendants 
in such cases, there must be some mechanism for allocating damages. 
Whatever harms are accounted for in these damages tallies should 
be attributable to the wrongful conduct of the defendant.  The under-
lying economic reasoning behind linking damages payments to the 
harms generated by the defendant’s actions is that doing so will create 
incentives for efficient behavior, as indicated by the full social cost en-
ergy framework in Table 1.  By imposing costs that reflect the social 
damages on the generator of pollution, the level of pollution gener-
ated will be at the socially efficient level, taking into account the full 
value of the harms associated with the polluting activity.  This ap-
23 Perhaps the most prominent environmental tobacco suit was brought on behalf 
of the flight attendant Norma Broin for damages she suffered from exposure to smoke 
in airplane cabins.  VISCUSI, supra note 2, at 133-34.  The case was Broin v. Philip Mor-
ris, Inc., No. 91-49738 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 5, 1998) (unpublished mem.). 
  
1670 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1657 
 
proach is the well-known Pigovian tax methodology in the economics 
externalities literature.24
Even after accepting this overall approach, there remains the mat-
ter of how to calculate damages that occur over a long period of time.  
In the case of cigarettes, the appropriate approach for calculating 
economic losses is the net present value of the costs over the lifetime.  
Thus, one calculates a trajectory of costs year by year, where these 
costs are calculated assuming smoking behavior and then compared 
with a situation in which the same individual is not a smoker.  The cal-
culation of damages associated with global warming should likewise be 
on a year-by-year basis.  Moreover, such damages must be net damages 
amounts.  For example, even if global warming leads to hurricane 
damages in any given year, the appropriate measure is the net in-
crease in the hurricane damages, because even in the absence of 
global warming, we face hurricane risks. 
The financial costs of smoking are quite diverse, with both positive 
and negative effects.  In much the same way, climate change may also 
have positive and negative effects.  According to Viscusi’s estimate of 
the financial costs of smoking, the net present value of the financial 
externalities associated with smoking are negative, not positive.25  The 
largest cost imposition consists of the medical care cost increase, 
which is $0.58 per pack.  Next in terms of order of magnitude are the 
foregone contributions to Social Security and Medicare that smokers 
would have made had premature mortality not shortened their work 
lives.  The offsetting financial components are those that represent 
cost savings resulting from smokers’ premature mortality, notably the 
reduced costs for Social Security, pensions, and nursing homes.  On 
balance, there are net financial savings to society of $0.32 per pack.  
Thus, from the standpoint of financial externalities alone, there is no 
cost imposition associated with smoking. 
Given that, on balance, cigarettes do not impose net financial 
costs, what was the rationale for damages in the state attorneys’ gen-
eral lawsuits?  The state litigation focused on one component, the 
Medicaid segment of the medical cost share, which is necessarily posi-
tive.  However, if one were to design an optimal tax strategy for ciga-
24 See DAVID A. ANDERSON, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND NATURAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT 298-99 (2004). 
25 These and other statistics cited below are from VISCUSI, supra note 2, at 73.  
These calculations use a 3% discount rate in bringing the costs back to their present 
value. 
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rettes, it would reflect the overall net costs, not the isolated compo-
nent amount.  Whether there are costs and how great they are depend 
on which costs get counted. 
The cigarette litigation approach could be applied in the context 
of global warming.  Suppose that the task is to calculate the financial 
externalities associated with gasoline.  One could assess the different 
components of the costs, such as the effects on agriculture, flooding, 
hurricanes, and more general harms to the ecosystem, and then calcu-
late their total.  In each instance, the costs calculated should be the 
net costs for each component. 
The appropriate remedy for market failures is also quite different 
for cigarettes than for climate change.  In the case of cigarettes, it is 
sufficient for manufacturers to provide accurate information to con-
sumers about the product so that buyers can make rational decisions.  
If people are fully informed of the risks and take all these risks into 
account when making their smoking choices, then there is no need to 
tax the product or undertake any other actions associated with the 
private risks of smoking.  For environmental tobacco smoke, matters 
are quite different.  Regulation or smoking restrictions of some kind 
may be the appropriate remedy.  There remains the issue of financial 
externalities associated with smoking, but whether these are positive 
or negative depends in large part on what costs are counted. 
That the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) was driven by po-
litical factors rather than by efficiency concers is reflected in the struc-
ture of the MSA proposals.  Ideally, a state’s share of the MSA should 
correspond to its share of the medical cost damages that were the ob-
ject of the litigation.  However, wide disparities exist.26  The state of 
Washington received 1.396 times its medical cost share, perhaps be-
cause its attorney general, Christine Gregoire, brokered the MSA.  
New York and California each received 13.0% of the MSA payments 
despite quite different medical cost shares of 15.2% for New York and 
8.6% for California.  The four leading tobacco-producing states—
North Carolina, Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee—each received 
considerably less than their medical cost share. 
Litigatory solutions to problems that should be governed by regu-
latory policies also entail substantial transactions costs.  Although data 
are not available for the costs incurred by the defendants in the state 
smoking lawsuits, the plaintiffs’ legal fees were quite substantial.  For 
26 See VISCUSI, supra note 2, at 46-47, for the supporting data below. 
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example, the attorneys received $1.43 billion or 35% of the Mississippi 
settlement, $3.43 billion or 26% of the Florida settlement, and $3.3 
billion or 19% of the Texas settlement.27  The substantial payoff 
amounts for these and other states not only indicate the high level of 
transactions costs, but also highlight the potential opportunities for 
rent-seeking behavior on behalf of these attorneys, who are paid on a 
contingency fee basis. 
III.  IGNORANCE AND THE GENERATIONAL DIVIDE:  PERCEPTIONS 
Why have government policies failed to meet the challenge posed 
by climate change?  Our hypothesis that the shortcomings of global 
climate change policies can be traced to citizen preferences can best 
be explored by examining the patterns of these citizen beliefs and 
choices that are made with respect to global climate change. 
Because of the prominence of climate change policies in Europe, 
where there has been widespread support for the Kyoto Protocol, 
there is substantial data available on how Europeans perceive the risks 
of global warming and what actions they have taken to address these 
risks.  These data are far more comprehensive than survey evidence 
for the United States. 
We primarily use data from Eurobarometer 57.0:  Agriculture, Energy, 
and Discrimination Issues, February–April 2002.28  We also use data from 
Eurobarometer 51.1, described in Part IV.  The Eurobarometer surveys 
have been conducted since 1970 and currently query about 1000 re-
spondents in each of the fifteen European Union (EU) member 
countries in the spring and fall of each year.29  The surveys are used to 
monitor social and political attitudes, especially attitudes toward the 
EU, and include special topics in different waves.  The Agriculture, 
Energy, and Discrimination Issues survey asks respondents a number 
27 Id. at 51. 
28 THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RE-
SEARCH, EUROBAROMETER 57.0:  AGRICULTURE, ENERGY, AND DISCRIMINATION ISSUES, 
FEBRUARY-APRIL 2002 (2d ed. 2005). 
29 These fifteen countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom.  East Germany and West Germany are identified separately, 
as are Ireland and Northern Ireland, and we analyze them as separate countries, bring-
ing the total number of countries to seventeen for the purposes of our analysis.  Nor-
way has occasionally been included in the surveys, but did not participate in the survey 
we use here. 
  
2007] ALLOCATING RESPONSIBILITY 1673 
 
of questions about their perceptions of energy use and the actions 
they take to curb energy use. 
The 2002 Eurobarometer survey provides a detailed perspective 
on how a large sample of 16,032 respondents perceives different con-
sequences of energy use.  The results considered in this Part pertain 
to the public’s perceptions of energy use, while the next Part exam-
ines the data regarding the public’s actions. 
We hypothesize that there are two factors that lead to inadequate 
public support for global warming policies.  First, ignorance may play 
an important role.  If people are not aware that there are substantial 
risks associated with global warming, this lack of awareness will subse-
quently influence their willingness to support policies addressing risks 
of climate change and to incur costs personally to address these risks.  
Second, because the time frame embodied in climate change policies 
extends far into the future, we hypothesize that older generations will 
be more reluctant to support climate change policies than younger 
generations.30  People who are 15 years old have a considerably longer 
life expectancy than those 65 or older.  Ignoring the risk of premature 
mortality, having an additional half century of life gives one a substan-
tial advantage in experiencing directly the effects of climate change 
policies and in having one’s children experience those effects.  Thus, 
our hypothesis is that there will be a substantial decline in support for 
climate change policies among those whose motivation is the altruistic 
concern for future generations, as opposed to a self-interest in reap-
ing the benefits of these policies. 
 Table 2 reports answers to a series of questions regarding people’s 
perceptions of various risks associated with climate change.31  The first 
column of perception results is the percentage of the sample that 
agrees with the following statement:  “Global warming and climate 
change are serious issues which need immediate action.”  While the 
overwhelming majority of respondents agree with that statement, the 
lowest figure observed is that for the ages-65-and-over group, of whom 
81.6% agree.  This level of agreement is significantly lower than the 
group average for ages 15-64, which is 88.6%. 
 
30 For a discussion of this hypothesis, see Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, The Genera-
tional Divide in Support for Environmental Policies:  European Evidence, 77 CLIMATIC 
CHANGE 121 (2006). 
31 These questions are all subparts of the following question from the Euro-
barometer survey:  “For each of the following, please tell me if it is the case or not.”  
CHRISTENSEN, supra note 28, at 5. 
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Table 2:  Percentage Agreeing with Global Warming Statements, by Age Group 
 
 
 
Age 
Group 
 
 
N 
Global  
Warming 
Needs  
Immediate 
Attention 
Fossil Fuels 
Contribute 
to Global  
Warming 
Transport 
Largely  
Responsible 
for Global 
Warming 
Nuclear 
Power  
Contributes 
to Global 
Warming 
 
15-24 2505 
 
88.9 
 
78.1 
 
73.5 
 
51.4 
 
25-34 2830 
 
89.4 
 
78.2 
 
71.6 
 
49.5 
 
35-44 2976 
 
88.2 
 
76.2 
 
72.1 
 
45.2 
 
45-54 2569 
 
90.3 
 
78.0 
 
74.5 
 
44.5 
 
55-64 2207 
 
85.8 
 
76.5 
 
72.1 
 
43.3 
 
65+ 2945 
 
81.6* 
 
69.7* 
 
69.8* 
 
40.4* 
All Ages 
15-64 13,087 
 
88.6 
 
77.4 
 
72.7 
 
46.9 
Source:  Authors’ calculations are based on Eurobarometer 57.0.  CHRISTENSEN, supra 
note 28.  Asterisks indicate statistically significant differences between the ages-15-64 
and ages-65-and-over groups, 1% level, two-tailed test.   
 
The second question, indicated in the second column of percep-
tion results in Table 2, is whether respondents agree with the follow-
ing statement:  “The use of fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas, etc.) contributes 
significantly to global warming and climate change.”  Once again, the 
same type of pattern is exhibited, as just under 70% of those ages 65 
and over agree with this true statement that fossil fuels contribute to 
global warming, compared to over 77% for younger age groups.  Very 
similar results appear for the third statement:  “Transport is largely re-
sponsible for global warming and climate change.” 
The final question indicated in Table 2 attempts to assess the ac-
curacy of the public’s risk beliefs.  It elicits opinions regarding a 
statement that is incorrect:  “Nuclear power contributes significantly 
to global warming and climate change.”  This statement is not correct 
because there are no pollution emissions from nuclear power that 
contribute to global warming, and indeed, nuclear power is often sug-
gested as an alternative mechanism for reducing the risks of climate 
change.  Yet almost half of all respondents agree with this incorrect 
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statement.  The perception that nuclear risks contribute to global 
warming is highest among the youngest age groups, and this pattern 
may reflect a general skepticism of nuclear power among the young. 
To examine the contribution of personal characteristics to the dif-
ferent preferences, we report multivariate probit regressions in Table 
3.  The continuous variables pertain to income levels, which have 
been converted to dollars; education in years; and individual age in 
years.  The categorical variables include whether the respondent is 
male, married, or still attending school. 
 Let us focus on the first of our two hypotheses:  lack of risk knowl-
edge and individual ignorance come into play and affect global warm-
ing beliefs.  Education is the main variable reflecting knowledge, and 
this variable has a consistently significant effect in the expected direc-
tion.  In particular, people with more education are more likely to 
agree with the first three true statements regarding global warming 
and are less likely to agree with the false statement regarding nuclear 
power.  Income levels, which are highly correlated with education, 
have similar directional effects. 
 
Table 3: Probit Regressions for Agreement with Global Warming Statement 
 Global 
Warming 
Needs  
Immediate 
Attention 
Fossil Fuels 
Contribute 
to Global 
Warming 
Transport 
Largely  
Responsible 
for Global 
Warming 
Nuclear 
Power  
Contributes 
to Global 
Warming 
Income x 10,000 -0.003 0.011** -0.000 -0.031** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Income Missing -0.019** -0.001 -0.038** -0.021* 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
Male 0.001 0.056** 0.022** -0.038** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Married 0.014* 0.011 0.038** 0.033** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Education 0.004** 0.010** 0.002* -0.012** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education– Still  
Studying 
0.012 0.015 0.009 -0.032 
(0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) 
Age 0.002** 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age Squared/ 
100 
-0.004** -0.003* -0.001 -0.003 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Source:  Authors’ calculations are based on Eurobarometer 57.0.  CHRISTENSEN, supra 
note 28.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Asterisk (*) indicates significance at 5% 
level;  double asterisks (**) indicate significance at 1% level.   
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Our second hypothesis pertains to age and the differential atti-
tudes of older respondents toward global warming.  The first column 
of regression results in Table 3, which concerns whether global warm-
ing needs immediate attention, reflects the nonlinear age effect that 
rises and then falls with age.  The second column of results, which 
pertains to fossil fuels, yields a negative effect of the quadratic age 
variable, which once again indicates that those 65 and older are less 
likely to agree with the global warming statement.  The final two col-
umns of results exhibit no statistically significant age effects, as the in-
clusion of the other variables in the analysis accounts for the signifi-
cant age differences that were exhibited in the overall mean values in 
Table 2. 
Closely related to the age effect is that people who are married, 
and consequently are more likely to have children with a stake in fu-
ture global warming policy benefits, are more likely to agree with the 
various statements regarding global warming.  That relationship is in 
fact borne out, with the only exception being fossil fuels, for which 
the coefficient is positive but not statistically significant. 
The other variables have more mixed effects.  Men seem to have a 
stronger belief that fossil fuels and transport contribute to global 
warming than do women, and they are also less skeptical of the dan-
gers of nuclear power. 
Exploration of the perceptions of global warming risks conse-
quently indicates that ignorance, as captured by the education vari-
able, is perhaps the most dominant factor in the difference in beliefs.  
Generational issues arise as well with respect to risk beliefs, but they 
are dampened and in some instances eliminated by the inclusion of 
the influence of a full set of demographic variables. 
IV.  IGNORANCE AND THE GENERATIONAL DIVIDE:  ACTIONS 
This Part continues the exploration of the roles of ignorance and 
generational interest with respect to global warming, but it does so 
within the context of individual actions as opposed to perceptions.  
Do education and age affect pollution-reducing actions directly?  Do 
risk beliefs also affect actions so that there is an additional indirect ef-
fect of the demographic variables via risk beliefs? 
One of the most prominent policy remedies that has been advo-
cated with respect to global climate change is a gasoline tax, which will 
reduce gasoline consumption and automobile emissions.  To what ex-
tent are our hypotheses regarding attitudes toward climate change 
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borne out in people’s support for gas taxes?  An earlier wave of the 
Eurobarometer, undertaken in 1999, included questions asking re-
spondents how much more they were willing to pay for petrol that 
would be less harmful to the environment.32  Rather than simply ask-
ing respondents if they thought that gasoline was harmful to the envi-
ronment, the question actually elicits an additional amount that peo-
ple would be willing to pay for gasoline if doing so would be protective 
of the environment. 
Table 4 summarizes the distribution of these willingness-to-pay 
amounts per liter of petrol.   
 
Table 4:  Willingness To Pay for Petrol That Is Less Harmful  
to the Environment, by Age Group 
 
Age Group 
Percentage 
Who Are 
Willing To 
Pay More 
Percent 
Amount 
More  
Willing To 
Pay 
Cents More 
per Liter 
Willing To 
Pay if  
Positive 
Cents 
More per 
Liter 
Willing 
To Pay 
15-24 22.1 2.8 11.8 2.6 
25-34 21.2 2.8 12.5 2.7 
35-44 19.4 2.3 11.7 2.3 
45-54 18.3 2.1 10.7 2.0 
55-64 16.4 1.6 9.5 1.6 
65+ 10.9 1.0 9.1 1.0 
All ages 15-64 19.7* 2.4* 11.5* 2.3* 
Source:  Authors’ calculations are based on Eurobarometer 51.1.  MELICH, supra note 32.  
Asterisk (*) indicates statistically significant differences between the ages-15-64 and 
ages-65-and-over groups, 1% level, two-tailed test.   
 
The first column gives the percentage who are willing to pay more 
for petrol; the second column presents the percentage amount more 
they are willing to pay; the third column presents in dollar terms the 
cents more per liter that people are willing to pay provided that the 
response is a nonzero value; and the final value is the cents more per 
liter that people are willing to pay including the zero responses.  What 
is striking about these statistics is that almost invariably there is a 
 
32 ANNA MELICH, INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, 
EUROBAROMETER 51.1:  ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND CONSUMER ASSOCIATIONS, APRIL-
MAY 1999 (2001). 
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steady decline in willingness to pay with age.  The starkest drop occurs 
when we move from the ages-55-64 group to the ages-65-and-over 
group.  In terms of the percentage who are willing to pay more and 
the percentage amount more they are willing to pay, the ages-65-and-
over group expresses roughly half of the willingness to pay as com-
pared to all people ages 15-64.  The existence of this pattern supports 
our hypothesis that there is a generational divide in support for cli-
mate change policies.33
The 2002 Eurobarometer survey does not repeat the gas price 
question but does include a diverse set of questions pertaining to ac-
tions that people are taking to save energy that are likely to affect 
global climate change.34  The first set of questions presented in Table 
5, Panel A, pertains to actions that people could take at home and at 
work.  The home-related behaviors are the following:  “Cut down on 
heating and/or air conditioning,” “Cut down on lighting and/or the 
use of domestic electrical appliances,” “Insulate(d) my house (walls, 
windows, etc.),” and “Taking initiatives to save energy at work.”  
Roughly one-third to one-half of all respondents have undertaken one 
or more of these actions, where the main outlier is saving energy at 
work.  Many people do not work, and those who do may not have con-
trol over energy savings. 
In terms of the age distributions of the patterns in Table 5, Panel 
A, there is an inverted U-shaped relation.  Precautions rise with age 
until middle age and then subsequently decline.  For two of the four 
categories, there is a statistically significant difference between the 
precautions taken by the ages-65-and-over group and those taken by 
all those ages 15-64, with a somewhat greater percentage of the oldest 
group undertaking the precaution of cutting lighting/appliances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 30, at 121.  This paper provided the mean values’ 
counterpart regression results, but did not include the statistics presented in Table 4. 
34 The questions in Table 5 are based on Eurobarometer 57.0 question 24.  CHRIS-
TENSEN, supra note 28, at 11. 
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Table 5:  Percentage Taking Action To Save Energy 
 
Panel A:  Home and Office Energy Usage 
 
Age Group 
Cut  
Heating/Air 
Conditioning 
Cut  
Lighting/ 
Appliances 
Insulate 
House 
Save  
Energy at 
Work 
15-24 29.9 42.2 16.3 5.1 
25-34 41.8 49.6 29.5 8.5 
35-44 45.2 52.8 41.0 10.7 
45-54 47.6 52.5 39.5 10.7 
55-64 45.3 52.5 39.3 6.2 
65+ 42.0   52.3* 34.2 2.6* 
All ages 15-64 42.0 50.0 33.2 8.3 
  
Panel B:  Transportation Energy Usage 
 
Age Group 
Reduce 
Travel 
Reduce 
Car Fuel 
Use 
Buy Car 
That Uses 
Less Fuel 
Use Public 
Transporta-
tion More 
15-24   7.6 13.4 10.1 24.0 
25-34   8.6 20.6 16.4 18.1 
35-44   9.7 24.4 20.3 16.0 
45-54 9.8 24.6 22.0 16.7 
55-64  9.4 23.1 18.3 18.0 
65+   9.0 19.0* 12.5* 19.0 
All ages 15-64 9.0 21.3 17.5 18.4 
Source:  Authors’ calculations are based on Eurobarometer 57.0.  CHRISTENSEN, supra 
note 28.  Asterisk (*) indicates statistically significant differences between the ages-15-
64 and ages-65-and-over groups, 5% level, two-tailed test.   
 
Table 5, Panel B gives the percentage of respondents who have 
undertaken various travel- and transportation-related actions.  These 
reductions in energy usage are less prevalent than the efforts with re-
spect to home heating and electricity use shown in Panel A.  As with 
the results in Panel A, there is an evident inverted U-shaped relation-
ship for many of the categories, as the reduction in car fuel usage and 
the purchase of cars that use less fuel rises with age and then subse-
quently declines.  The only effects for the ages-65-and-over group that 
differ significantly from the effects for all those ages 15-64 are that 
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members of the oldest group are less likely to reduce their car fuel us-
age and/or buy a car that uses less fuel. 
The inverted U-shaped relationship between these energy conser-
vation measures and age is particularly intriguing in that it may reflect 
a more general U-shaped relationship between environmental benefit 
valuation and age.  Such a relationship is not unprecedented.  A con-
siderable recent literature has documented an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship between people’s willingness to pay for risk reductions involv-
ing fatality risk to themselves and their age.35  The impetus for such a 
relationship is that individual consumption and income follow a pat-
tern over the life cycle, as people’s income rises through middle age 
and subsequently declines through their elderly years.  Thus, the eco-
nomic resources that they can draw upon to fund either energy-saving 
methods or other risk reduction activities are likely to track this in-
verted U-shaped relationship observed for life-cycle consumption pat-
terns. 
To account for the differential role of age and other demographic 
variables, Table 6 presents the probit regression results that are the 
counterparts to the percentage figures in Table 5.  These variables 
parallel those in the earlier regressions, with the addition of the four 
perceptional variables that were the subject of the analysis in the pre-
vious tables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 A review of this literature appears in Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Age Differ-
ences in the Value of Statistical Life:  Labor Market Evidence, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 
(forthcoming 2007) (on file with authors). 
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Table 6:  Probit Regressions for Actions To Save Energy 
 
Panel A:  Home and Office Energy Usage 
 Cut  
Heating/Air 
Conditioning 
Cut  
Lighting/ 
Appliances 
Insulate 
House 
Save  
Energy at 
Work 
Income x 10,000 0.016**  0.008** 0.022** 0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
Income Missing -0.004 -0.065** 0.067** 0.010 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) 
Male -0.040** -0.077** 0.003 0.013** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) 
Married 0.009 -0.003 0.108** 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) 
Education 0.007** 0.003** 0.009** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Education– Still 
Studying 
-0.043** 
(0.017) 
-0.018 
(0.017) 
-0.050** 
(0.016) 
-0.031** 
(0.006) 
Age 0.012** 0.007** 0.015** 0.005** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age Squared/100 -0.011** -0.006** -0.013** -0.006** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Global Warming    
Needs Immediate 
Attention 
0.019 
(0.013) 
0.048** 
(0.013) 
0.026* 
(0.012) 
-0.000 
(0.007) 
Fossil Fuels  
Contribute to 
Global Warming 
0.009 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
0.020* 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
Transport Largely 
Responsible for 
Global Warming 
0.019 
(0.010) 
0.041** 
(0.010) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
Nuclear Power  
Contributes to 
Global Warming 
0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.020* 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
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Panel B:  Transportation Energy Usage 
 
Reduce 
Travel 
Reduce 
Car Fuel 
Use 
Buy Car 
That Uses 
Less Fuel 
Use Public 
Transporta-
tion More 
Income x 10,000 -0.002 0.007** 0.010** -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Income Missing -0.021** -0.020* 0.028** -0.038** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Male -0.001 0.023** 0.019** -0.033** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Married 0.012* 0.040** 0.033** -0.049** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Education 0.001* 0.008** 0.006** 0.008** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education– Still 
Studying 
-0.018* 
(0.009) 
-0.048** 
(0.012) 
-0.029* 
(0.012) 
0.063** 
(0.014) 
Age 0.000 0.007** 0.010** -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age Squared/100 -0.000 -0.007** -0.011** 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Global Warming 
Needs Immediate 
Attention 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
0.035** 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
0.041** 
(0.010) 
Fossil Fuels  
Contribute to 
Global Warming 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.025** 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.021** 
(0.008) 
Transport Largely 
Responsible for 
Global Warming 
0.022** 
(0.005) 
0.030** 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.007) 
0.023** 
(0.007) 
Nuclear Power  
Contributes to 
Global Warming 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.028** 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.018** 
(0.006) 
Source:  Authors’ calculations are based on Eurobarometer 57.0.  CHRISTENSEN, supra 
note 28.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Asterisk (*) indicates significance at 5% 
level;  double asterisks (**) indicate significance at 1% level.   
 
It is useful to begin with these perceptional variables, as they indi-
cate how people’s beliefs regarding global warming affect various en-
ergy-saving activities.  Controlling for other influences, people who be-
lieve global warming needs immediate attention are significantly more 
likely to cut their use of lighting/appliances, insulate their houses, re-
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duce car fuel usage, and increase public transportation usage.  People 
who believe fossil fuels contribute to global warming are also more 
likely to insulate their houses, reduce car fuel usage, and increase 
public transportation usage.  Similarly, there is a significant positive 
effect on cutting lighting/appliances, reducing travel, reducing car 
fuel usage, and increasing public transportation usage if the respon-
dent believes that transport is largely responsible for global warming.  
Perception of various problems associated with global warming and 
understanding of the pertinent linkages with respect to these sources 
of emissions and global warming consequently lead to energy-saving 
activities, controlling for other factors.  The various demographic vari-
ables that influence these perceptions consequently have an indirect 
effect on energy saving through their effect on risk beliefs. 
The nuclear power perceptional results are particularly interest-
ing.  People who incorrectly believe that nuclear power contributes to 
global warming are less likely to insulate their houses, less likely to re-
duce car fuel usage, and less likely to increase public transportation 
usage.  Quite simply, people who are misinformed and whose beliefs 
are based on factual errors with respect to their understanding of 
global climate change are less likely to undertake the kind of substan-
tive actions that are needed on an individual basis to reduce pollution 
emissions. 
The age variable has a more prominent effect with respect to ac-
tions than with respect to perceptions.  In every instance except for 
reducing travel and the use of public transportation, the significant 
age influence is that of a positive age effect followed by a negative 
quadratic age effect.  Thus, the influence of age is that there is a rise 
in taking actions to save energy as one ages, but there is a decline over 
the life cycle.  For the older age groups there will be less concrete ac-
tion to reduce energy, which is consistent with the results for the will-
ingness to pay for gas taxes to protect the environment. 
Similarly, marital status has a role similar to that of life-cycle fac-
tors.  People who are married are more likely to have children and so 
have a longer-term interest in protecting the environment.  Marriage 
has a positive and statistically significant effect on insulating the 
house, reducing travel, reducing car fuel usage, and buying a car that 
uses less fuel.  The only negative effect is that people who are married 
are less likely to use public transportation, which may be attributable 
to the greater inconvenience associated with transporting children by 
public transit as opposed to by private vehicles. 
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Education continues to have a prominent role as well; income is 
also influential.  Even accounting for people’s perceptions of the four 
global warming questions, there is a positive effect of education on 
every one of the energy-saving activities.  To the extent that education 
is another measure of information, being informed about the risk 
clearly leads to greater protective behaviors.  Both education and in-
come level will capture wealth effects.  People who are richer have 
greater financial resources.  Because environmental quality is a nor-
mal economic good, those with higher income will undertake these 
various energy-saving actions to protect the environment and to save 
energy.  A countervailing factor is that poor people may have greater 
economic needs, and saving energy may better enable them to stay 
within a more limited budget.  The linear income effects are statisti-
cally significant in six of the eight instances, and these effects are al-
ways positive.  Richer people, better-educated people, and better-
informed people are all more willing to undertake actions to conserve 
energy. 
V.  WHY SOCIETY FAILS:  UNCERTAINTY AND DISCOUNTING 
There are two key features of the risks of climate change that in-
tersect with various forms of irrationality:  uncertainty and discount-
ing.  Because government policies result at least in part from pressures 
exerted by the public, analyzing the sources of public preferences as 
they relate to the characteristics of global warming policy assessments 
provides some insight into why such policies have failed.  In particu-
lar, we hypothesize that the policy failures can be traced in part to in-
dividual irrationality, both with respect to the uncertainties involved 
in climate change risk assessments and the long time periods that are 
involved.  These two factors bring into play the potential irrationalities 
involved in discounting distant outcomes. 
The role of uncertainty is quite complex, both from the stand-
point of uncertainty at any point in time as well as uncertainty over 
time.  How do people react to such uncertainty?  At any particular 
time, if there is a distribution of possible losses around some mean 
level, then people will generally be more averse to the variable loss 
situation than to facing a risk of losing the mean value of the loss.36  
36 By definition, this is what we mean by risk aversion.  A risk-averse person would 
prefer the mean value of a lottery to the lottery itself if there is some risk of loss. See, 
e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 185-86 (1995) (presenting 
the utility calculations that accompany risk-aversion measurement). 
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That pattern of behavior is a standard result in economics, assuming 
that people are risk averse.  Because of the presence of risk aversion as 
a component of many people’s preferences with respect to risky 
choices, people are willing to buy insurance and pay an amount that is 
greater than their expected losses to reduce the potential variability of 
outcomes that would occur had they not been insured. 
While this risk aversion relationship is true on a theoretical basis, 
premised on the usual assumption that people are risk averse, on a 
practical level it may not always be borne out.  Kahneman and Tversky 
developed a model called “prospect theory,” which incorporates many 
forms of individual irrationality.37  One anomaly that they found is 
that people would be willing to take a gamble on a potentially large 
loss rather than incur a loss that will occur with certainty.  To the ex-
tent that this experimentally documented irrationality holds true, it 
would suggest that the public is unwilling to make real sacrifices to 
avert a distribution of possible harms where the extent of the real sac-
rifice required exceeds that of the lowest possible harm that might oc-
cur.  Thus, if climate change might either pose no social cost or a very 
large social cost, then someone might be unwilling to incur a substan-
tial cost now to avert this lottery on climate change damages. 
A second aspect of the uncertainty is not with respect to the dis-
tribution of the losses but rather the precision with which they are es-
timated.  There are many kinds of risks for which we have precise 
data.  Automobile accidents are chief among these; we have a large 
sample of outcomes regarding fatal and nonfatal accidents so that the 
risks associated with automobile transportation are well known.  In 
contrast, we do not have a sufficient experience base with respect to 
the kinds of prospective climate change risks that might happen in the 
future.  Scientists estimate various models regarding temperature 
shifts, and based on these models there are scientific predictions as to 
the consequences.  However, there are broad bands of error associ-
ated with these estimates, as we are dealing with a situation of uncer-
tainty rather than simply one of risk. 
Situations of uncertainty are well known in the economics litera-
ture and come under the general heading of ambiguity regarding the 
risk.  For choices involving an ambiguous chance of success, Ellsberg 
37 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:  An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274-89 (1979) (proposing prospect theory as an 
alternative to expected utility theory). 
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documented that people will exhibit ambiguity aversion.38  Thus, a 
precisely understood 50% chance of winning a particular prize is 
preferable to a 50-50 chance that is less precisely known.  This phe-
nomenon is known as the Ellsberg Paradox.39  Viscusi and Magat 
found that this phenomenon also extends to the environmental loss 
domain, as people exhibit ambiguity aversion with respect to uncer-
tainty regarding environmental losses.40
While people may often exhibit ambiguity aversion, they may not 
do so if the prospect of losses has a very high probability.41  In particu-
lar, environmental risk ambiguity could have the opposite influence.  
An experimental study of this issue focused on extreme risks associ-
ated with global warming.42  The study was based on a survey that 
asked a sample of business managers in North Carolina how they 
would respond to different risks associated with storm damage linked 
to climate change.  The pertinent result for thinking about climate 
change policy is that while people exhibit ambiguity aversion for in-
termediate level risks, when the probability of damage becomes very 
high, people regard greater ambiguity as desirable, thus muting the 
level of concern with climate change risks. 
What could be driving such a surprising result?  The underlying 
intuition is captured in the following medical scenario.  Suppose that 
you go to the doctor and undergo some tests to discover whether you 
have a fatal form of cancer.  The doctor tells you that the risk is only 1 
in 100 that you have this fatal cancer.  For that kind of low probability, 
people would prefer to know that the risk is precisely estimated rather 
than being told the risk might be lower or greater than 1 in 100.  If, 
however, the cancer risk probability is quite high, such as a 90% 
chance that your cancer is fatal, it would provide some reassurance for 
the doctor to say that this probability is very imprecisely estimated so 
that in fact it could be much lower than 90%.  Thus, for high prob-
abilities of an adverse outcome, the imprecision of the probability en-
38 See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643, 669 
(1961) (illustrating that, in situations with highly ambiguous information, reasonable 
people will violate the Savage axioms due to a “specified decision rule”:  ambiguity 
aversion). 
39 W. Kip Viscusi & Wesley A. Magat, Bayesian Decisions with Ambiguous Belief Aver-
sion, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 371, 385 (1992). 
40 Id. at 384-85. 
41 W. Kip Viscusi & Harrell Chesson, Hopes and Fears:  The Conflicting Effects of Risk 
Ambiguity, 47 THEORY & DECISION 153, 153-56 (1999). 
42 Id. at 158-73. 
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ables the person facing the adverse risk to seek some refuge in the 
possibility that the risks might not be as high as the mean values sug-
gest. 
This kind of phenomenon might come into play with respect to 
both individual choice and the climate change debate.  From the 
standpoint of individuals, if there is some chance that the doomsayers 
regarding the substantial risks of climate change are wrong, then the 
imprecision of the estimates makes people think that the risks are 
equivalent to a lower value of a precisely known risk as opposed to an 
uncertain risk. 
The existence of this scientific uncertainty can also be exploited 
politically.  Because of the substantial uncertainty affecting estimates 
of the extent of climate change and its consequences, those opposing 
regulatory action may suggest that there might be no risk at all.  If 
there might be no risk at all, why take action?  Exploiting the rhetori-
cal features of uncertainty consequently may serve to undermine ef-
forts to take action.  The claim that we should await further research 
may resonate with the public because of the presence of ambiguity-
seeking behavior for large risks, coupled with the reluctance of people 
to incur a certain cost now to address a lottery on uncertain damages. 
Another way in which uncertainty affects the policy debate is that 
in situations in which risks are imprecisely estimated, information of-
ten has a substantial value.  If we can resolve many of the key uncer-
tainties, we will be able to make more sensible decisions regarding 
which risks should be addressed.  Because acquiring information takes 
time, in a statistical decision theory context it may be desirable to 
postpone a decision and obtain additional information before com-
mitting resources.43  This general principle, coupled with the ability of 
political administrations to push off the imposition of cost so that it 
will be borne by subsequent administrations, creates the incentive for 
inordinate amounts of examination and exploration of the uncertain-
ties as opposed to taking concrete actions to address the risks that we 
perceive to be present based upon the best available scientific evi-
dence. 
Whether we should incur costs now to address uncertain risks will 
depend in part on the irreversibility of the harms that are occurring.  
Thus, if current emissions will have an irreversible effect on the envi-
43 The value of information is stressed in a variety of statistical decision theory 
texts.  See, e.g., HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS:  INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON 
CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2d ed. McGraw-Hill 1997) (1968). 
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ronment, there is a general result in economics that we should invest 
more in preventing the irreversible harms than we should if they were 
not irreversible.44  Thus, while information acquisition may create a 
rationale for some postponement of decisions, the presence of sub-
stantial expected losses due to climate change, combined with the ir-
reversibilities associated with failures to take policy actions now, sug-
gests that the current failures to address the uncertain risks do not 
represent a rational policy response, but instead represent a policy 
failure. 
A second class of irrationalities influencing preferences with re-
spect to climate change policies pertains to the time periods involved.  
The risks of climate change are relatively remote, extending to the 
end of the twenty-first century and beyond.45  The extent to which 
people discount these effects will have a substantial influence on the 
level of public support for making current sacrifices now to generate 
distant benefits.  The influence of these payoffs in the future from 
policies undertaken now raises the fundamental normative policy is-
sue of whether future effects should be discounted and, if so, to what 
extent. 
In many respects, this policy approach in which future effects are 
recognized but discounted should be regarded as placing a substantial 
weight on the future.  Simply counting the climate change reduction 
benefits in the future as zero is what would happen if there were no 
altruistic concern of current generations for future well-being.  How-
ever, a fully efficient social welfare function that takes into account 
these future generations will value these benefits according to the will-
ingness to pay for the benefits that these future generations might 
have if they were able to express their preferences.  This approach will 
fully recognize the valuations of future generations if they were able to 
express them, but it will discount them back to their present value us-
ing the same kind of discounting approach that would be applied if 
the benefits were more immediate. 
We advocate consistent discounting of choices both within and 
across generations.  In particular, if the benefits for policies to current 
generations are discounted at some interest rate r, then consistent pol-
44 One of the first discussions of irreversible environmental choice problems ap-
pears in Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, 
and Irreversibility, 88 Q.J. ECON. 312, 314-19 (1974). 
45 See IPCC, 2001 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 8, at 8-14 (presenting data project-
ing gradual change over the next 100 years). 
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icy choices across time will continue to use that discount rate r in 
weighting the benefits at different points in time that occur to future 
generations.46  Thus, policies will be based on the present value of 
their benefits and costs using some discount rate r that is identical for 
current and future generations. 
This seemingly even-handed approach to weighting the benefits to 
future generations is not the only analytical strategy that one might 
pursue in converting future effects into their present value.  One 
might, for example, use a preferential discount rate that is lower for 
future generations than for current generations.47  In the extreme, 
this preferential rate could be zero, in which case there is no discount-
ing of distant future effects.  The rationale for advocating this ap-
proach is that use of a preferential discount rate will increase the 
weight given to future effects, which otherwise would be substantially 
reduced by the influence of discounting.  While it is true that mean-
ingful discounting will reduce future effects’ present value, doing so is 
consistent with rational intertemporal choice.  Moreover, from a po-
litical standpoint, decisions are being made by the present generation 
to expend resources to advance social welfare as they perceive it.  If 
the people alive today express intertemporal preferences that are cap-
tured by some interest rate r, then they would have to be extremely al-
truistic with respect to future generations to use a lower discount rate 
for effects that benefit future generations but do not benefit them-
selves.  Indeed, the full recognition of benefits to future generations 
according to their expected willingness to pay for these benefits al-
ready represents an enormous altruistic aspect of the policy assess-
ment. 
An intriguing counterexample to the conventional discounting 
approach is offered by Dean Richard Revesz.48  Suppose there are two 
periods, generation 1 and generation 2.  There are 100 units of a 
good to allocate across these periods, and there is no production.  
Suppose the preferences  for the good )(xU x  are the same in each 
period and that the discount factor (1/(1 + interest rate)) is given by 
β , where β  is less than 1.0.  The standard economic prescription is to 
 
46 A more complete articulation of the approach we take here appears in W. Kip 
Viscusi, Rational Discounting for Regulatory Analysis, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. (Winter 2007). 
47 Intergenerational preferences are advocated in Richard L. Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
941, 1015-16 (1999). 
48 This example, which is based on his Symposium comments, also appears in his 
article.  Id. at 998-99. 
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choose the amount x consumed in period 1 to maximize the dis-
counted utility over the two periods, or ).100()( xUxU −+ β   Because 
β  is less than 1, it will be desirable to consume more than half of the 
good for period 1, leading to a solution such as 55 units for genera-
tion 1 and 45 units for generation 2.49  Note that this discounted wel-
fare maximization is quite different from the completely selfish gen-
eration 1 approach, which is to consume all 100 units in the first 
period. 
Revesz suggests instead that the morally fair outcome is an even 
50-50 split across the generations.  This outcome is not only fair, but it 
is also efficient in a no-discounting world that maximizes 
  Note that if there is no discounting of effects for fu-
ture generations, then a $1 annual future environmental cost imposes 
an infinite loss and is sufficient to swamp any near-term concerns.
).100()( xUxU −+
50
For those who find this example compelling, suppose instead that 
there is a random 50-50 chance that you would live in generation 1 or 
generation 2.  Then the allocation that maximizes your discounted 
expected utility is ),100(5.0)(5.0 xUxU −+ β  which can be written as 
[ )100()(5.0 xUxU −+ ]β .  Because the 0.5 factor simply alters the scale, 
it does not affect the division of the good across the two periods, so 
the earlier 55-45 split remains optimal.  Equal division only becomes 
efficient if there is, in effect, no concern about time delay so that β  
equals 1.0. 
The main debate should not be whether there should be a prefer-
able discount rate, but whether, apart from discounting, there is full 
weight given to the preferences of future generations.  Are we close to 
being in a world in which there is a 100-0 split across generations, so 
that future preferences simply are ignored?  If that is the case, proper 
discounting of fully recognized future effects may offer a major ad-
vance toward the equalization of resource division advocated by schol-
ars like Revesz. 
These discounting issues pertain to the normative policy analysis 
use of discounting, but temporal preferences come into play from a 
behavioral standpoint as well.  Because the political reality of choices 
is based on the preferences of present generations, we hypothesize 
that the greatest progress that might be made on the intertemporal 
 
49 We assume utility functions of the usual shape, implying decreasing marginal 
utility with positive first derivatives and negative second derivatives. 
50 For further discussion of the anomalies that arise from failure to discount, see 
Viscusi, supra note 46. 
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choice front would not be achieved by using a discount rate that is in-
consistent with rational discount rates for present generations, but 
rather by focusing greater attention on the role of intertemporal irra-
tionalities.  Behavioral discounting anomalies may be of greater con-
sequence than normative discounting policy assessment practices be-
cause they affect the level of public support for making current 
sacrifices to generate future benefits.  A considerable literature has 
documented the influence of hyperbolic discounting.51  The discount 
rates revealed through individual decisions often are not inconsistent 
over time, as they reflect an inconsistently high weighting on immedi-
ate benefits. 
The study on water quality benefit valuation by Viscusi and Huber 
found that people place an enormous weight on water quality im-
provements that would occur immediately rather than in more distant 
years.52  The survey considered water quality improvements that would 
occur in the current year or after a lag of two years, four years, or six 
years.  The strong preference that people exhibited with respect to 
having the improvement occur now as opposed to after two years was 
reflected in the fact that the rate of interest r that they used to dis-
count benefits after two years ranged from 12.7% to 14.3%.53  There 
was a substantial undervaluation if benefits were deferred for a two-
year period.54  Subsequent delays were less disadvantaged relative to 
the two-year delay.  Thus, for delays of four years or more, people had 
a rate of time preference ranging from 8% to just under 9%.55  In 
terms of how intertemporal preferences affect policies, the biggest 
source of irrationality is in terms of the present versus any benefits 
that may occur in the future.  Benefits that occur fifty years from now 
as opposed to twenty-five years from now are not especially hard hit.  
51 Among the many contributions to the hyperbolic discounting literature are:  
Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time 
Preference:  A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 351 (2002); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and 
Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997); and R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsis-
tency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165 (1956). 
52 The discussion below and all empirical evidence are drawn from W. Kip Viscusi 
& Joel Huber, Hyperbolic Discounting of Public Goods (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 11935, 2006), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/ 
w11935.pdf. 
53 Id. at 38. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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Rather, it is simply the deferral of benefits that is most instrumental in 
driving the irrational preoccupation with immediate consequences.56
Because of the inordinate weight that people give to immediate 
effects, there will be a reluctance for the general public and for their 
representatives to incur current losses now to achieve distant benefits.  
Immediate effects receive full weight, indeed, an inordinate weight, 
compared to any deferred benefits.  This intertemporal myopia will 
create a substantial bias against forward-looking policies.  Environ-
mental regulations that confer a near-term payoff will fare relatively 
well as compared to environmental regulations for which there is a 
time delay after the costs have occurred and before the benefits are 
experienced.  Such a deficiency suggests that even if the public cor-
rectly valued the benefits and costs of global warming policies at dif-
ferent points in time, there would still be a substantial inadequacy in 
the public’s willingness to support policy interventions because of the 
devaluation of all deferred benefits that increases because of hyper-
bolic discounting.  The challenge for government policy is to over-
come these and other irrationalities that have undermined a mean-
ingful policy approach to managing the risks of global warming. 
CONCLUSION 
The climate change litigation has a much more tenuous economic 
basis than the cigarette litigation, notwithstanding some superficial 
parallels.  The harms associated with global warming involve current 
and past actions, but the harms are largely prospective rather than 
current.  The uncertain magnitude and timing of the harms compli-
cate the analysis, but under the most optimistic scenario, it might be 
possible to develop a present value estimate of the expected damages 
associated with greenhouse gas emissions. 
Unfortunately, these emissions cannot be traced to any particular 
inadequacy on the part of likely defendants in these cases.  Pollution 
emissions involve an inherent externality that is associated with all 
common forms of energy usage.  If there are a variety of competitors 
in a market, these problems simply cannot be addressed unilaterally.  
By definition, a competitive market implies that no individual firm can 
set prices; rather, prices are driven by the market.  As a result, the op-
tion of raising prices to discourage energy usage is not a viable option 
for any particular firm.  Similarly, providing information to consumers 
56 Id. at 26-28. 
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and other usual remedies of market failures will not suffice.  The 
problem is not one of wrongful conduct on the part of the defendants 
but rather is that they are selling a good that inherently generates ad-
verse environmental consequences. 
A remedy for such environmental externalities situations is some 
form of government regulation or pollution tax.  Ideally, we want all 
energy sources to reflect their full social costs.  Energy taxes that ac-
count for the global warming damages could establish appropriate in-
centives.  A substantial literature has explored the appropriate level of 
carbon taxes, for example.57  Other types of restraints, such as pollu-
tion reduction targets, also could play a productive role.  However, 
these all involve collective action rather than unilateral action by a 
particular firm. 
Climate change litigation is not particularly well suited to estab-
lishing these incentives.  A lump sum damages payment by energy 
companies will not alter market prices, production decisions, or con-
sumption decisions.  By definition, these lump sum costs are fixed.  As 
a result, current behaviors will be unaffected due to the lack of any in-
centives pertaining to these behaviors.  Consequently, if there is a set-
tlement of climate change litigation that consists largely of a fixed 
damages payment, then this litigation will only serve the redistributive 
function of transferring money from energy producers to plaintiffs’ 
attorneys but will not foster a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. 
What could promote such reductions is an energy tax, which 
could be implemented by structuring the settlement of the litigation 
appropriately.  For example, the cigarette litigation settlement did not 
consist of a substantial lump sum payment.  Rather, it embodied a 
formula that was roughly tantamount to a $0.40 per pack tax on ciga-
rettes.58  In much the same way, the settlement of the climate change 
litigation could impose an energy usage tax that would discourage 
consumption.  There is, however, no guarantee that this would be the 
approach followed in structuring any damages amount for the litiga-
tion. 
There is also a more fundamental concern about whether litiga-
tion is the appropriate venue for setting such tax levels.  There is no 
assurance that the plaintiffs in these cases will seek tax equivalent pen-
alty levels that reflect the marginal damages associated with the energy 
usage.  The incentives of the plaintiffs are presumably to maximize 
57 E.g., Boyd, Krutilla & Viscusi, supra note 6. 
58 VISCUSI, supra note 2, at 41. 
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their own welfare rather than to maximize social welfare.  Rent-
seeking behavior rather than social welfare maximization may be the 
driving force.  Any resolution of the litigation will be driven by the 
private incentives in the negotiation between the plaintiffs and the de-
fendants.  In contrast, energy tax policy will be the result of collective 
political action in which the legislature, representing the citizenry, will 
vote to impose the tax that is reflective of society’s preferences. 
 That there has been a policy failure to date does not necessarily 
imply that there will continue to be a policy failure in the future.  The 
unwillingness of the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol perhaps 
reflects the substantial costs that would be involved in meeting the 
pollution reduction targets rather than a simple lack of concern with 
respect to climate change problems.  The policy task is to develop 
public support for more aggressive global warming policies.59  The 
appropriate remedy for the climate change policy failures is to im-
prove these policies rather than to shift responsibility for government 
regulation to the courts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 Indeed, the recent book and movie by former Vice President Gore might be 
viewed as a major contribution to that effort.  AL GORE, AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH:  
THE PLANETARY EMERGENCY OF GLOBAL WARMING AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 
(2006); AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (Paramount Pictures 2006). 
